

談話と関連性¹

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Summary

Discourse and Relevance

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In this paper, I have argued that (i) relevance theory (first proposed by Sperber & Wilson 1986) can capture a lot of discourse phenomena, while truth-based, coherence-based and old/new information-based analyses are insufficient for explaining them ; (ii) RT can contribute not only to what is implicated but also to what is said (e. g. THE) ; (iii) RT can provide a natural explanation for metonymy understanding ; (iv) RT can also account for why discourse connectives such as ALSO and TOO are used as 'procedural encoding' ; (v) this newly developed cognitive pragmatics can be extended to provide quite an interesting topic, i. e. 'typology of discourse connectives' ; and finally (vi) topics such as echo questions can be nicely solved in terms of 'resemblance'.

1. Introduction

本稿の目的は談話と関連性との関わりを、従来の談話分析・認知意味論などによる不十分さを指摘し、認知語用論である関連性理論 (Relevance theory, 以下では RT) による分析のほうが優れていることを具体例を幾つか考察しながら、検討することである。

2. 談話とメトニミー理解の問題

2.1 Encoded Concept and Metonymy

- (1) (カラオケで歌った後で、周りの人が言ったこと) 「いいのどをしているわ」
- (2) (三大テノールの一人が、のどの調子が悪くて、医者にみてもらったところ、どこも悪くないとわかって言われたこと) 「いいのどしていますね」
- (3) (あまり考えていない人に向かって) Use your head! —CIDE (=Think more carefully)
- (4) (プロレスでタッグを組んでいる味方の選手のアドバイス) “Use your head!”

問題点 1 : 認知意味論では【のど→声】【のど→発声器官 (声帯など)】【head→頭脳】【head→額】としてそれぞれ (1) - (4) の記号化された概念を一対一に決めてしまう (source domain から target domain への metonymic mapping で説明する) のであるが、関連性理論ではあらゆる記号化された概念は解釈する人の知識などにより、多くのゆれを認め、そのなかで、どれか一つの解釈に至るにはすべての発話が例外なく optimal relevance の適用を受けるということになる。

Cf. RT では Concept を holistic approach (Jerry Fodor 流) し、<Cf. decompositionalist approach (Jerrold Katz 流) に反対する。lexical concepts/phrasal concepts/idiomatic concepts と memory との関係も考慮する必要あり。

Cf. Carston (1985), Sperber & Wilson (1986 : 86) >, 各概念は次の 3 つの要素からなるとする :

logical entry : a set of deductive rules which apply to logical forms of which that concept is a constituent.

encyclopaedic entry : information about the objects, events and/or properties which instantiate it.

lexical entry : information about the natural-language counterpart of the concept.

2.2 部分・全体の関係と方向性²

- (5) a. I saw a house among the trees. [The roof] was freshly painted.

《全体が a house と示され、部分 the roof となる方が processing effort が少ないと思われる》

- b. I saw **a mast** in the harbor. [The boat] was coming.——山梨 (1992 : 87)

《部分 a mast が示され、全体が the boat とわかるのにはかなりの処理努力が必要》

- (6) a. 大阪城にお花見に行く。＜花 (の category) →桜＞

- b. 庭の花に水をやる。＜花→植物全体＞

- c. GARRISON : Ya ever read you *Shakespeare*, Bill?

BROUSSARD : Yeah, I do.

GARRISON : *Julius Caesar*. —JFK <Shakespeare の書いた本 (全体) →Julius Caesar という作品 (部分)> —橋本 (1998)

3. 談話結合に関して

3.1 truth-based/coherence-based approach vs. relevance-based approach

《参照 : Blakemore (1988b, 1992), Blass (1990), Wilson (1994)》

- (a) Whereas **coherence** is defined as a relation between linguistic units (that is, utterances, segments of a text), **relevance** is a relation between propositions. — Blakemore (1988b : 240)

- (b) **Propositions** are psychological representations and inferences are psychological computations performed over those representations. —Blakemore (1989 : 19)

- (i) **Truth-based approach** : Choose the interpretation that is most likely to be true.

- (ii) **Coherence-based approach**

Assumes that hearers are looking for an interpretation that is coherent with prior discourse. Coherence relations : Cause-consequence relation, etc.

- (iii) **The relevance-based approach**

Assumes that hearers are looking for an interpretation that is optimally relevant. —Wilson (1994)

- (7) My son has grown another foot. —Wilson (1992)

- (7a) 私の息子は他の足をはやした<翻訳ソフト『こりゃ英和』による翻訳>

- (7b) 私の息子はもう1フィート (30cm くらい) 背がのびた

- (8) 無い物はない。 —西山 (1995)

- (8a) (tautology の解釈) 「無い」物は「無い」。→常に true

- (8b) (「どんなものでもある」という解釈)

- (9) さあ、いらっしゃい、いらっしゃい。無い物はないよ。

問題点2 : truth-based approach では (8) も (8a) のような true な解釈をとることを予測し、実際に人間が行う (8b) のような解釈を退けるので不十分。

- (10) John said that Mary died on Thursday.

(10a) John [said on Thursday] that Mary died.

(10b) John said that [Mary died on Thursday].

truth-based approach では (10) は (10a) (10b) どちらも可能性ありとするが、なぜ (10b) のほうが好まれるかという説明ができない。

PARSING (統語解析) と disambiguation について Frazier & Fodor (1978) は ‘Minimal attachment’ (要素を結合するには、その結合接点の数になるだけ少なくなるようにするのが最適) とする考えを述べているが、次の (ii) ではこの原則が守られない解釈がとられるので、minimal attachment という考えは不十分で、relevance がここでも必要になる。

(i) Pat kissed the girl and her sister too. $\langle_{NP}[NP \text{ Conj } NP]\rangle$ —minimal attachment

(ii) Pat kissed the girl and her sister cried. $\langle_s[S \text{ Conj }_s[NP + VP]]\rangle$ —non-minimal attachment

4. 談話と coherence-based analysis の問題

Coherence-based approach : Hearers are looking for an interpretation that is coherent with prior discourse.

Sequeiros (1995 : 179) による coherence の定義 : Cf. Lascarides & Asher (1993), Hobbs (1979) a discourse is ‘coherent’ if it exhibits structural relationships between its various segments, which depend on the propositional form of the segments.

4.1

(11) John loves baseball. But he lost his bat.

(11a) ジョンは野球のバットを失った<<coherence に基づく解釈>>

(11b) ジョンはコウモリを失った<<coherence に基づかない解釈>>

(12) Peter : What did Susan say ?

Mary : You’ve dropped your wallet.

(12a) Susan said that you’ve dropped your wallet.

<<下線部は Susan の言った内容 : coherence に基づく解釈>>

(12b) You’ve dropped your wallet.

<<Susan の言った内容ではなく、とっさに Mary が言ったこと>>

問題点 3 :

coherence-based approach ではなぜとっさに相手にあることを急いで忠告して用いた (12b) の解釈の方が可能かという説明ができない。

問題点 4 :

Lascarides & Asher (1993 : 440)³ による coherence relations の定義とそれらの反例 :

Explanation (α , β) : the event described in β explains why α ’s event happened

(13) Max fell. John pushed him.

(13') a. ? Peter phoned Mary. *Bell invented the telephone.* —Sequeiros (1995 : 181)

b. ? *The crystalline particles underwent a process of separation.* John dropped the glass.

Cf. The glass broke. John dropped it.

Elaboration (α, β) : β 's event is part of α 's

(14) The council built the bridge. The architect drew up the plans.

(14') ? The day came to a close. *The sun rose in the east.* —Sequeiros (1995 : 182)

Narration (α, β) : The event described in β is a consequence of the event described in α

(15) Max stood up. John greeted him.

Background (α, β) : The state described in β is the 'backdrop' or circumstances under which the event in α occurred

(16) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.

(16') ? Max opened the fridge. The forest was dirty. —Sequeiros (1995 : 183)

<"it is not clear in what way the eventuality described by the second utterance can be interpreted as a background to the eventuality described by the first utterance" —Sequeiros (1995 : 182)>

Result (α, β) : The event described in α caused the event or state described in β

(17) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.

4.2 coherence-based analysis では discourse-initial utterances や isolated utterances の説明ができない。

(18) a. <A leaves the house with a parcel and flowers. B says : >

So you are going to the birthday party. —Blass (1990 : 16)

b. CLARA : ## Emmett, I read that book, too! You—you're quoting Jules Verne, "From the Earth to the Moon." —*Back to the Future, III*, p. 65

c. Andrew : ## Actually, Valerie, I hate tests. —*English Journal*, Dec. 1995, p. 41

Cf. CLARA : Science? W—What sort of science? Uh, astronomy? Chemistry?

DOC : Actually, I'm a student of all sciences.

—*Back to the Future III*, p. 45

(19) ## What can you say about a twenty-five-year-old girl who died?

—Erich Segal, Love story <## 談話の始まりを示す>

4.3 coherence の関係は保たれていても、意味をなさない (nonsense) 談話が存在する。

(20) John was late. The station clock had struck nine. It was time for Susan to start work. She took the first essay from the pile. It was by Mary Jones. Mary had not been well for weeks. The doctor told her to take a holiday. The problem was that she couldn't afford one. Living in London is now very expensive. All central

government subsidies to the Greater London Council have been abolished.

Paradoxically, this might be seen to follow from the premises of Libertarian Anarchism. The minor premise might be difficult for the reader to discern. Our theorem-proving program does this using a 'crossed-syllogism' technique. — Blakemore (1988b : 233)

- 4.4 coherence の原則は守っているが、ある状況では適切だが、ある状況では不適切ということが説明できない。

- (21) I have spent the last two years in Ivory Coast, which is very pleasant. It has plenty of exotic fruits and the people are extremely lovable.

<友人にあてた手紙としては適切だが、入国審査書への記入としては不適切> — Blass (1985 : 6)

- 4.5 cohesion だけでは discourse well-formedness のための必要条件でも十分条件でもない——Blass (1990 : 16)

連結性 (Cf. 山梨1989 : 236-44)

The concept of **cohesion** is a semantic one ; it refers to relations of meaning that exist within the text, and that define it as a text.

Cohesion occurs when the interpretation of some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another. —Halliday and Hasan (1976 : 4)

- (22) The wise master makes his servants respect him. The unwise master makes his servants despise him. —Blass (1990 : 17) <antonymy あるいは semantic opposition の関係>

- 4.6 何ら言語的に連結性を示すもの (cohesive devices) がないのに談話では可能な場合の説明ができない。

- (23) A : Where can I get a good meal around here ?

B : I'm afraid I'm a bit in a hurry. —Blass (1990 : 16)

coherence に対する RT の答え :

Sperber & Wilson (1986 : 263) it can be shown that cohesion and coherence are derivative categories, ultimately derivable from relevance.

5. 談話と知識の問題

共有知識 (Mutual knowledge) は話し手と聞き手のあいだでコンテキストの構成・選択に必ずしも必要な条件でないと関連性理論では考えるので注意 (cf. code system)。

Cf. 認知的明白性 (Cognitive manifestness) —Blass (1990 : 31)

- 5.1 frame 知識<語彙的選択と知識 : encyclopaedic entry (knowledge) /concept>

Frame などの知識構造から常に典型的知識 (default knowledge) で解釈を行っているわけ

ではない。—Blakemore (1988)

(24) If I'd known it was going to be fish, I would have put my **contact lenses** on.

《fish の frame 知識のなかには通常 contact lenses は入っていないし、contact lenses の中にも fish はいっていない。関連性理論では聞き手が解釈の際にすでに記憶している決まった知識を用いるのではなく、必要なコンテキストを選び出すのでこのような場合にも解釈が可能となる》

(25) The river had been dry for a long time. Everybody attended the funeral.

Assumption i : <If a river has been dry for a long time, then a river spirit has died.>

Assumption ii : <If somebody has died, then there is a funeral.> —Blass (1985 : 1, 28)

《アフリカのシサーラという言葉話を話している人たちには上記 i . ii の想定があり、(25) の 2 つの文は問題なく連結可能と関連性理論では説明可能》

5.2 Bridging assumption (橋渡し知識)

定冠詞 the の解釈をめぐる

首尾一貫性 (coherence) として従来分析されていた現象に関して

指示対象の連合関係 → Bridging assumptions 《参照 : Wilson (1994), Matsui (1993)》

(26) a. John went out with Mary last night. [The three witches] were excellent. — Wilson (1994)

b. John went to the theatre with Mary last night. [The three witches] were excellent.

c. John saw a Shakespeare play with Mary last night. [The three witches] were excellent.

d. John saw 'Macbeth' with Mary last night. [The three witches] were excellent.

《(26a) — (26b) — (26c) — (26d) となるに従って、3 人の魔女と access しやすい Shakespeare とか Macbeth という記号化された概念があり、聞き手はその間に橋渡しの想定をめぐらし、より理解しやすくなると関連性理論では説明可能。》

(27) a. John went walking in Central Park last night. [The mugger] took all his money.

b. John went walking in Central Park last night. [The bus-riding home] was restful.

(28) a. I moved from Tokyo to Saitama. [The rent] was less expensive. —Matsui (1993)

b. I moved from Tokyo to Saitama. [The rent] was too expensive.

《なお H. Clark の the shortest possible bridge という分析では (28a, b) とともに The rent は

埼玉のを指すと間違えて予測するが、関連性理論では最短距離は関係なく、異なった想定により説明可能≫

(29) The train pulled into the station. [The passengers] ran for [the taxis].

≪(29) では乗客は train のであり、station のではなく、 taxis は train のではなく station のであるということは並行処理していることになり、想定とも合致してより処理努力のかからないように解釈している点に注意≫

6. 談話と old/new information

6.1 It-clefts and Wh-clefts の認知的違いは何か

foreground information vs. background information : 関連性に関わる用語で定義。

WH-cleft, IT-cleft の構文 : 聞き手にそれぞれ違った処理方法を指示し、聞き手の処理努力を少なくするのに役立っている。すなわち手続き的記号化 Procedural encoding ということになる。Cf. Jucker (1993b), Kato (1997)

Conceptual meaning (概念的意味)

The meaning of a linguistic expression is

(a) conceptual if and only if it encodes a concept

(i. e. an element of a conceptual representation ; conceptual representation can be brought to consciousness. e. g. dog, cat, yesterday, again, soon...

procedural meaning (手続き的意味)

(b) procedural if and only if it encodes information about computations (i. e. about how the utterance is to be processed) l: procedural representation cannot be brought to consciousness.

(30) a. Earnest's ignorance annoyed Elaine.

b. It was [Earnest's ignorance] [that annoyed Elaine].

(foreground information) (background information)

c. [What annoyed Elaine] was [Earnest's ignorance].

(background information) (foreground information)

d. [Earnest's ignorance] was [what annoyed Elaine].

(foreground information) (background information)

In noncleft sentences, the distinction between foreground and background depends on the scope of the sentence focus and is gradual.

focal scale : 厳密に順序づけられ、焦点強勢の付与によって決まる分析的含意の集合

foreground implication : ある発話の focal scale のなかの含意がそれ自体コンテキスト効

果をもち、よってそれ自体関連性があるとき (relevant)

background implication : そうでない場合。必要とされる処理努力を減らすことにより間接的しか関連性に貢献しない情報で、既知 (old information) や前提 (presupposition) である必要はない。

- (31) Although Americans plainly want decisive action against cocaine, there is little sign of national consensus on the best way to beat the drug epidemic. Some want tougher law enforcement against cocaine trafficking, while others want stepped-up efforts to prevent cocaine abuse and treat its victims ; a vocal minority, meanwhile, continues to argue for outright legalization. What all three points of view have in common is a conspicuous hunger for quick results, and it is precisely there that Bush and his drug czar, William Bennet, are likely encounter their biggest political problems. —*Newsweek*, Sept. 18, 1989

<従来の It-that の焦点に新情報が来るという分析では説明できない。なぜなら precisely there は旧情報で that 節に新情報が来ているからである。ただし、RT では繰り返しの要素もコンテキスト効果の計算に関わる関連性をもつとするので問題ない。>

- (32) ## It was several days later that he called her. It was in the evening. He ate dinner in the university cafeteria, then walked up toward his rooming house and into the phone booth on the corner of his block. —Charles Webb, *The Graduate*, p. 145

- (33) ## What we have set as our goal is the grammatical capacity of children— a part of their linguistic competence. —Ellen Prince (1978) “A comparison of wh-clefts and it-clefts in discourse” *Language* Vol. 54, No. 4, p. 883

<この例では wh-cleft の background information は英語学の論文のはじまりなので、先行する discourse はないが、知識から推論できる>

Old information だが It...that の焦点の位置に来る場合 :

- (34) Tsutomu Harada is boss of the Osaka-based company Capital Corp. He was tipped off by a professor of biotechnology that **the bacteria** used to make soybeans rot could be the answer to smelly feet. Sticky fermenting soybeans called **natto** are a common breakfast food in Japan. They're usually eaten with rice. It's the bacteria that makes the beans ferment, which will see foot odor as a tasty snack.—*English Journal*, Dec. 1995, p. 22

- (35) V : Hello, and welcome to the Christmas edition of the English Journal, I'm Valerie Koehn.

A : And I'm Andrew MacBain. The Christmas edition, Valerie ?

V : Well, it's actually called the December edition, but Christmas is in December,

so ...

A : Okay, call it what you will, but what's important are the contents of the issue.

—*English Journal*, Dec. 1995, p. 2

(36) a. You look very tired. It is a **good** rest that you need most now.

b. You look very tired. What you need most now is a **good** rest.

Assumption : <If x looks very tired, then x needs a good rest.>

(37) a. ## *Hi! It is a **cup of sugar** that I wonder if I might borrow this time.

b. ## Hi! What I wonder if I might borrow this time is a **cup of sugar**.

<先行状況がないと, (37a) の a cup of sugar が何らかのコンテクスト効果を生み出す計算をしようとしても無限の可能性があり, 通常談話のはじまりには用いられない。一方 (37b) では borrow と a cup of sugar を結びつけられ, コンテクスト効果も計算できるので問題ない。>

6.2 情報の焦点 (Focus) と relevance

話し手が関連性が高いと考える部分に聞き手の注意をひこうとするので, そこにアクセントを置き, 関連性の低い部分にはアクセントを置かない。Cf. Blass (1990 : 136-7,170), Blakemore (1987 : 97-104)

(38) a. **JOHN** also left. —John, in addition to someone other than John, left.

b. John also **LEFT**. —John left, in addition to doing something other than leaving.

7. 談話と省略の問題

欠けている要素がある場合, どのような状況のもとでそれを理解できるのか?

<<Groefsema (1995 : 142-3) Cf. Fillmore (1986)>>

(39) a. She **won**. <<the election/the game>>.

b. *She **won**. <<the gold medal>>.

(40) Ann : I don't know how to finish this letter.

Sue : Why don't you put 'yours sincerely'? <<at the end of your letter>>

(41) ? Mary walked to the table with a book in her hand. She **put** the book. <<なぜ on the table を補った解釈はできないのか>>

(42) John, Bruce and Mary were playing a game which involved putting something on the table.

John put his book, Bruce put his pipe, and Mary (put) her glasses. <<なぜ on the table を補った解釈が可能か>>

(43) A : Do you know whether Chris and Camilla got all the wedding presents they wanted?

B : Well, I don't know. We **gave** the coffee grinder.

統語論では厳密下位範疇化規則により put は義務的に目的語と場所を表す要素をとることになっているが、以下の例が示すように場所を表す前置詞句が状況から理解できる場合には欠けている現象をどのように説明するか：

《Groefsema (1995 : 142-3) Cf. Fillmore (1986)》

‘the missing information can be immediately retrieved from’

the previous information given : DNC verbs : accept/object/wait...

8. 談話と照応関係：代名詞の解釈をめぐる⁴

指示 (reference) → Reference assignment/constraints on lower-level explicatures

問題点 5 : cohesive に基づく分析では John も Bill もどちらも He を指しうるとなるが、なぜ John のみが可能か説明できない—Blass (1985 : 4)

(44) John can open Bill's safe. He knows the combination.

問題点 6 : 代名詞の解釈の内容が異なる場合どのように統一的に説明できるか

＜関連性理論では認知的違いは accessible information の違いによると説明可能＞

(45) a. Mark thinks he's clever. [he ≠ Mark] (referential pronoun)

＜representations of information visually present to the speaker and hearer＞

b. Mark thinks he's clever. [he = Mark] (coreferential pronoun)

＜information already represented either in previous propositions or in what precedes the part of the utterance the hearer is processing＞

c. My gran put her paycheck under the bed, but everyone with any sense put it in the bank. [it = their paycheck] (lazy pronoun)

＜information from the logical form of the sentence (its linguistic content)＞

《参照：Kempson (1988 : 142-3, 153)》

9. 談話と形容詞の解釈

(46) a. It is always very hot. —Blass (1990 : 39) 《暑い・辛いので曖昧》

b. Smelly feet are a fact of life for some people. However much you wash them, they just get hot and smelly again. —*English Journal*, Dec. 1995, p. 21

(47) But my friend knows next to nothing about computers, only that they are “cool.” —*Hiragana Times*, Feb. 1997, p. 122 《Cool はカッコいいの意》

10. 談話と数量詞の解釈

(48) A : What's on television ?

B : Nothing. —Blakemore (1992 : 11) 《見るべき番組が何もないの意》

(49) All the trains stop at Osaka Station. (新大阪駅の表示) 《新大阪に止まる電車はすべての意》

11. 談話と広告

- (50) これはあれなんですね？（第8回ラクロス選手権大会の広告）《illustration には2人のラクロスのラケットをもって試合をしている写真があるので、「このスポーツはラクロスなんですね」と解釈可能》

deliberate ambiguity (e. g. Advertisement) の分析をめぐって

Advertisement → enrichment

- (51) a. *Less bread. No jam.* <ロンドン地下鉄の London Transport の広告>
b. If you travel by London transport it will cost you less than travelling by car, and you will suffer no traffic jams, unlike when travelling by car. —Tanaka (1992 : 93-4)

12. 談話連結詞 (Discourse connectives) と relevance

Constraints on implicatures/procedural meanings

《参照 : Blakemore (1989), Jucker (1993a), Higashimori (1995)》

12.1 付加的 : そして, それから, あるいは, 同様に, さらに

問題点7 : AND のあるなしで, どのように認知的計算が異なるか ; Relevance の計算をする
範囲の指定はどのように考えるのか (i) P and Q. (ii) P. AND Q. (iii) P. Q 《参照 : Carston (1993), Higashimori (1992c)》

- (52) a. John broke his leg [結果]. He slipped on a banana skin [原因].
b. John broke his leg and he slipped on a banana skin. —Carston (1993 : 33)
- (53) a. I met an interesting man at MIT ; I met Noam Chomsky.
b. I met an interesting man at MIT and I met Noam Chomsky. —Wilson
《(53a) では MIT で会った人 = Noam Chomsky, (53b) では2人は別人》

conjunctive use of AND (P AND Q)

Semantic Command :

The second conjunct of AND is not prior to the first conjunct chronologically and causally.

non-conjunctive use (P. Q) :

Assumption Schema

'P because Q'

問題点8 : TOO と ALSO とは認知的にどのように異なるのか

従来の談話分析 : TOO も ALSO もともに追加 (addition) を表す

関連性理論 : 異なる手続き的意味を encode する Cf. Blass (1990 : ch. 4)

		parallel processing	parallel premises	backwards confirmation	backwards contradiction
英語	also	+	+	—	—
	too	+	—	+	+
<hr/>					
ドイツ語	auch	+	+	+	—
Sissala	ma	+	+	+	—
<hr/>					
イタリア語	anche	+	—	—	—
	pure	+	—	—	—

表 1

◀Blass (1990), Higashimori (1992a, , 1994a)▶

Parallel processing :

(54) A : Prof. Wilson lives in Oxford.

B : Prof. TANAKA lives in Oxford, too.

Prof. Tanaka **ALSO** lives in Oxford.

(54)' If x lives in Oxford, then x can go to Blackwell's.

Parallel premises :

(55) A : Keiko was doing aerobics.

B : { **Also,** } she had a salad for lunch.
{ ***Too,** }

(55)' If x was doing aerobics, then x wanted to lose weight.

(55)" If x had a salad for lunch, then x wanted to lose weight.

Backwards confirmation :

(56) A : That's a pretty house!

B : It is, { **TOO.** }
{ ***also.** }

Cf. IT is, **too**.

Backwards contradiction :

(57) A : You can't really believe in both.

B : You can { **too.** }
{ ***also.** }

12.2 反意的：しかし、ところで、にもかかわらず、だが

(58) 味は鉄分独特の苦みで、ちょっとくせがある。しかし、効能は高く評価されていて、特に胃や腸をきれいにする作用がある。＜JR の琢野温泉のコマーシャル＞

BUT and discourse expectation denial case : Higashimori (1992b : 344)

(59) Mark : Kyoko, are you the eldest sister?

Kyoko : Yes, but why? —*English Journal*, June 1986, p. 129

Context for interpreting the first conjunct :

(59') If (I say) 'yes', then (you will expect to infer that) *I know why my answer is relevant.*

The second conjunct can be interpreted at the explicature level :

(59'') *I don't know why my answer is relevant.*

Discourse-initial BUT : Higashimori (1992b : 340)

(60) *But*, you had you hair cut! —COBUILD

Context for interpreting the first conjunct :

(60') If you usually wear your hair long, (the speaker expects) *you like hair long.*

Context for interpreting the second conjunct :

(60'') If you had your hair cut, (the speaker expects) *you don't like hair long.*

問題点 9 : BUT, YET, STILL の認知的違いは何か

Higashimori (1992b, 1994b)

(61) a. The storm blew over the tennis-court. *But/Yet* the referee decided to let the match go on.

b. It's raining ; still we must go out. —LD²

	backwards contradiction	hearer's cognitive precondition	hearer's belief in strong dependency between the antecedent and consequent of the premise
X BUT Y	+	—	—
X YET Y	+	—	+
X STILL Y	+	+	—

表 2

Cf. 一般化したものから例外を取り出す仕方の認知的違いから BUT, EXCEPT, EXCEPT FOR の説明可能 : Higashimori (1994b)

12.3 因果的 : それで, だから, そのため, そのせいで

問題点10 : AND と AND SO の認知的違いは何か

The meaning of a linguistic expression is

(i) conceptual if and only if it encodes a concept

(ii) procedural if and only if it encodes information about computations.

(62) a. It started to rain and so we stopped the game.

b. It started to rain and as a result we stopped the game. —Blakemore (1992 : 153)

(63) If John leaves, and so Bill leaves, I'll be happy.

(64) a. These are his footprints ; he's been here recently. —Carston (1993 : 44-6)

b. These are his footprints and he's been here recently.

- (65) a. These are his footprints ; **so**, he's been here recently.
 b. ? These are his footprints **and so** he's been here recently.
- (66) She fed him poisoned stew **and (so)** he died.
- (67) These are his footprints
 a. ***and** he's been here recently.
 b. ? **and so** he's been here recently.
 c. **and so** I know he's been here recently.
 d. **and so**, clearly/without doubt, he's been here recently.
- (68) I mean, like all other Asians we've had experience during the war, but since the past, I think, 15 years, we have all these Asian countries neighbors, have had every close ties already with Japan.
 And **so therefore**, if we are all sending troops and we are sacrificing our soldiers, we feel that Japan also should help. —*English Journal*, July 1993, p. 25

問題点11 : SO と THEREFORE の認知的違いは何か

- (69) DOC : As you reminded me, Marty, I'm a scientist, so I must be scientific about this. I cautioned you about disrupting the continuum for your own personal benefit. **Therefore**, I must do no less. —*Back to the Future III*, p. 71
- (70) <The speaker sees someone arrive home laden with parcels.>
So/? Therefore you've spent all your money.
- (71) A : Your clothes smell of perfume.
 B : **So** (what) ?/***Therefore** (what) ?
- (72) It's been a busy day, **so/*therefore**...
- (73) A : It's raining.
 B : **So** the grass is wet.
 Propositions expressed by (72) : (a) It's raining. (b) The grass is wet.
 Procedural information encoded by **SO** : Process (b) as a conclusion.
- (74) He is an Englishman. He is, **therefore**, brave.
 <P. **Therefore** Q. = P. It is consequence of P that Q.> Blakemore (1992 : 153)
- (75) If John hit Mary and **therefore** she was covered in bruises, she will win her suit for damages. (Cf. Kempson 1975)
- (76) It was to do with the fact that if Britain lost the Falkland Islands, they would lose British soil nearer to Antarctica than Argentinian soil. **So therefore**, Britain had to hang on to the Falklands in order to have a claim on Antarctica. —*English Journal*, June 1988, p. 175 (Higashimori 1992c : 345)

12.4 Irrelevance markers

問題点12：聞き手の背後にある知識 (background assumptions) の組み替えを要求する標識は？

well signals the need for renegotiating the relevant background assumptions. —Jucker (1993 : 443)

(77) a. <a marker of insufficiency>

Zelda : Are you from Philadelphia ?

Sally : *Well* I grew up uh out in the suburbs. And then I lived for about seven years up in upstate New York. And then I came back here t'go to college.

b. <a face-threat mitigator>

A : Can I just see them

B : um *well* I'm not allowed to do that

c. <a frame> = the beginning of a new topic

A : and I said *well* I don't really think I could write—and this sort of ninety-six page booklet you know about that big.

d. <a delay device>

B : on the floor

A : on on [ði:] well on [ði:] you know on [ði:] hatchway there.

問題点13：通常の関連性の原則が一時的に働かない irrelevant な領域を指定する標識は？

(78) I don't know why I settled on Aberdeen, but anyway I did... —COBUILD²

procedural BUT : Adopt the conclusion drawn from Q, and deny the previous conclusion.

procedural ANYWAY : Process Q as an irrelevant proposition

12.5 'Addition to the existing contexts' markers

問題点14：聞き手のコンテキスト (context) に新たに付け加えるように指示する標識は？

YOU KNOW——Schourup & Waida (1988) *English Connectives*. Tokyo : くろしお出版.

(79) a. *Y'know*, there's nothing quite as refreshing as a Coca-Cola.

b. Eva : Do you mind if we play just one more game of rummy ?

Bob : You agreed to teach Emi's class in the morning, *you know*.

c. On the end of the hammer there was a kind of triangular ring thing, *you know*.
Something to hang it by.

d. *What does a Rolls Royce cost, *y'know* ?

(80) Well, I think one of the advantages that Virgin has in Britain in being in a number of different areas, whether it's, *you know*, record retailing or the airline or cinemas, is that we can, *you know*, bring our other businesses and all the people that come through our other businesses to bear, to help our new companies. But I think the most important thing that our other businesses bring is that, *you know*, hopefully

the name Virgin is synonymous with quality. —*English Journal*, Dec. 1995, p. 8

12.6 Correlation of discourse connectives (Higashimori 1995)

問題点15: 2 つ以上の手続き的意味を表すものが現れた場合の計算をどのようにするのか

◀Cf. Stenstrom (1994) 'well I mean you know' (appealer)▶

(81) Michiko : The weather is usually really good in October.

Joe : Well, I'll try for October, then/*so.

—*English Journal*, April 1993, p. 51

'SO' : procedural⑥ : Process Q (=you're going to work eight to noon) as a conclusion.

'HUH' : pocedrua⑤ : Process X (=Mary) 's opinion of Q with a dissociative attitude.

◀⑥+⑤=Process Q as a conclusion and process X's opinion of Q with a dissociative attitude.▶

SO... (inferential) THEN

<Imagine that I have arrived home laden with parcels.> —Blakemore

- (82) a. So, you've spent all your money.
b. You've spent all your money, then.
c. ? Then you've spent all your money.
d. (?) Then, you've spent all your money.
e. So, you've spent all your money, then.

'SO' : procedural⑥ : Process Q (=You've spent all your money) as a conclusion based on some concrete evidence.

'THEN' : procedural⑥ : Process Q as a conclusion based on some hypothetical reasoning.

2. SO+AFTER ALL

(83) "So, for studying a foreign language, the foundation is essential after all." —*Hiraganatimes*, April 1994, p. 8

'SO' : procedural⑥ : Process Q as a conclusion based on some concrete evidence.

'AFTER 'ALL' : procedural⑥ : Process Q as a denial of expectation P

WELL+THEN/*SO

(84) Michiko : The weather is usually really good in October.

Joe : Well, I'll try for October, then/*so.

—*English Journal*, April 1993, p. 51

'WELL' : procedural⑥ : Renegotiate the relevant background assumptions. —Jucker (1993)

'THEN' : procedural⑥ : Process Q as a conclusion based on some hypothetical reasoning.

12.7 Direction of discourse processing

問題点16 : processing の方向性などについての日本語・英語などの対象研究が必要

- (85) a. [X datte Y] : the information flow is backward directing ;
b. [X dakara Y] : the information flow is forward directing ;
c. [X demo Y] : the information flow is forward directing. —Maynard (1994 : 76)

13. 談話とイディオムの理解 (idiom comprehension)

- (86) Gerooge : Did the old man *kick the bucket* last night ?
Edward : Nah, he barely nudged *it*. —Gluckberg (1993 : 8)
- (87) Nick : “I don’t know what to do about Henry, he continues to do so poorly in school.”
Alice : “Don’t *give up the ship*. I’m sure he’ll do better once he improves his study habits.” —Gluckberg (1993 : 18)
- (88) One 5—year—old girl learned the expression *spill the beans* as meaning “tell a secret.” Later that same day, she told her father, “*Don’t throw the beans to Rebecca!* She’s not supposed to know! (Greenberg-Concool,1990)
- (89) 昭和天皇 : 柔道は骨が折れますか ?
山下選手 : ときどき骨が折れます。
- (90) carry coals to Newcastle / carry sands to Saudi Arabia
《無駄なことをするの意で前者の類推で後者も実際に新聞などで用いられる》

14. 談話と丁寧さ (Politeness) : social assumptions

《Cf. Clark (1994)》

- (91) BIFF : Oh. Don’t be so gullible, McFly. Got the place fixed up nice, though, McFly
...Hey, I had your car towed all the way to your house and all you got for me is Lite Beer ?

(laughing)

BIFF : What are you lookin’ at...butthead? Say hi to your Mom for me.

—*Back to the Future*, p. 11

Utterance : What are you looking at ?

Logical form : “you” is looking at “what”.

Friendly interpretation :

contextual assumption :

There are a number of things that the hearer is looking at.

Relevance :

Unfriendly interpretation

Contextual assumption :

The hearer is looking at the speaker.

Relevance :

The speaker does not know what the
relevant completion is.

The speaker knows exactly what
the relevant completion is.

Relevance is a relation which is defined not only for utterances but also for assumptions (i. e. units of non-linguistic, encyclopaedic and social information).

Cf. Blass (1990 : 41) a relevance relation, a relation between utterances and context.

Verbal communication involves a combination of coding and inference.

Cf. A : Mrs X is an old bag.

B : The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it?

SOCIAL ASSUMPTION : If B is deliberately ignoring A's remark, he believes it should not be discussed. —Cf. Wilson & Sperber (1986 : 72-3)

15. 談話と繰り返し表現 (Repetition)⁴

RT では繰り返しは processing efforts を必要とするが、コンテキスト効果をいろいろと生み出すと考える。《Blass (1985 : 5), S&W (1986 : 219)》

(92) a. Help. Help.

b. Go down Washington Street. Just follow Washington Street three blocks to Adams Street.

c. ? A box of cornflakes, please. A box of cornflakes, please. A box of cornflakes, please.....

d. ? I'd like a box of cornflakes. I'd like a box with cornflakes in it. Just take some cornflakes off the shelf and bring them to me, please. —Blass (1985 : 5)

(93) a. Here's a red sock, here's a red sock, here's a blue sock.

b. We went for a long, long, walk.

c. There were houses, houses everywhere.

d. I shall never, never smoke again.

e. There's a fox, a fox in the garden.

f. My childhood days are gone, gone. —Sperber and Wilson (1986 : 219)

16. 談話と問い返し疑問文 (Echo question)

Resemblance → interpretive use 《Blakemore (1994)》

(94) 'Oliver, you're sick.'

'I'm what?'

'You're very sick.' —Erich Segal, *Oliver's Story*, p. 7

Blakemore (1995 : 204)

Yes-no echoes must be analysed as representations of propositions

- (95) a. A uttered (the word) tomato
 b. A uttered (the sound) /tama : tou/
 c. A asked whether A can eat a tomato
 d. A thinks that echo questions are not interrogatives.

(96) A : My parents will be arriving tonight.

B : They'll be arriving WHEN?

(97) A : My brothers and sisters are arriving tonight.

B : Your siblings are arriving WHEN?

Blakemore (1994 : 204)

wh-echoes are analysed as representations of incomplete propositional forms

- (98) a. A uttered when word
 b. A uttered when sounds
 c. A asked whether when proposition
 d. A thinks when proposition
 e. A referred to when

Noh (1995) では (100) の例のように視覚的に得た情報が頭の中に入り、それにエコーしても疑問文が使われることを指摘している。

(p. 126) "echo questions may be used to focus on an aspect of the proposition expressed, implicatures, morphology, phonology, style, or register, foci, and connotations, and the echoer expresses his attitude to (an aspect, or part of) a prior utterance, or at least a representation in context."

(p. 133) "The attitude in echo questions is 'wondering about a prior utterance or thought'

(99) Peter to Mary : Have you ever been to Paris? —Noh (1995 : 127)

Mary : *Have I ever been to Paris?*

(100) After proceeding 1 mile in an hour, a driver sees a road sign which reads

'ROADWORKS AHEAD, DELAYS POSSIBLE'. The driver says,

'Delays possible?'

(101) A : I saw you kissing a woman on Oxford Street yesterday.

B : *You saw me kissing a woman?* That was my wife. We went out last night.

(102) A : Did you call the POLice?

B : *POLice?* I called the poLICE.

17. 談話と間接的発話の理解（推論に基づく意味関係）

→contextual effects/non-demonstrative inference

(103) A : Do you like African food ?

B : It is always very hot.

Assumption : <If the food is very hot, then A likes it.>

Implicated conclusion : <A likes African food.>

18. 談話と Joke : resemblance, inference

(104) A very agitated lady got her doctor on the phone. 'Come quick', she cried, 'My son has just swallowed a fountain pen'. The doctor remained calm. 'I'll be over as soon as I can', he said, 'but there are several patients in the waiting room. You may not see me for three or four hours'. 'Three or four hours' echoed the lady, 'What shall I do in the meantime?' 'You'll just have to use a pencil', said the doctor. (Bennet A. Cerf, *Laughing Stock*) —Blakemore (1992 : 13-4)

最後に関連性理論の基本的な事柄をまとめておこう :

関連性理論 : 聞き手側での発話解釈 (utterance interpretation) :

- (i) 発話 (utterance), (ii) コンテキスト (context/hearer's contextual assumptions), (iii) コンテキスト効果 (contextual effects)

関連性の原理 (principle of relevance) とはコンテキスト効果 (contextual effects) と処理努力 (processing efforts) により定義され, 聞き手が発話解釈の際, 頭の中で計算する認知的 (cognitive) 原則。(a) コンテキスト効果が多ければ多いほど, 関連性は高くなり, (b) 処理努力が小さければ小さいほど関連性は高くなる。

最適の関連性 (optimal relevance) とは (a) 聞き手の注意に十分値するコンテキスト効果を生み出し, (b) 聞き手がそのコンテキスト効果を達成するのに不必要な処理努力を課さない場合をいう。

Cf. Sperber & Wilson (1995 : 271) 'the second, or communicative, principle of relevance'

Cf. optimal relevance とは要するにとっても弱いものであり, 異なった聞き手あるいは同じ聞き手でも異なった状況では処理努力に十分値するコンテキスト効果が何かということに関して, 異なった判断をする可能性も認めたものである。

- (i) The hearer does not (indeed, could not in principle) consider all possible interpretations before deciding on the intended one.

それゆえ maximal relevance でなく optimal relevance が重要な用語となる。

- (ii) Of a range of acceptable combinations of utterance, context, and contextual effects, it looks as if what actual hearers do is choose the smallest, most accessible, and hence least effort-consuming one. They choose, in other words,

the first interpretation that is satisfactory at all.

コンテキスト (contexts, contextual assumptions) とは心理的なもので、発話解釈のために必要とされる聞き手の知識の集合 (= 命題の集合) で、前もって与えられているものではなく、コンテキスト選択 (context selection) により、聞き手が可能な知識の中から、utterance を聞いた後、解釈のために、最小限の努力で最大限の効果を生み出すコンテキストを選び出すものである。—S&W (1986 : 15)

コンテキスト効果 (contextual/cognitive effects) とは聞き手がもっている想定 (= 知識) を (a) 強化 (strengthening) したり、(b) 放棄 (eliminating) したり、あるいは発話内容と聞き手が持つ想定 (= コンテキスト) から聞き手の認知環境を変える (c) 新たな想定 (contextual implication) が得られた場合をいい、つまり聞き手の認知環境 (cognitive environment) になんらかの変化を与える情報は「関連性」(relevance) を持つと言える。

参考：そもそも想定 of 放棄・強化を「推論」と呼ぶのはいささか強引？—今井 (1995 : 29)

Cf. 西山 (Cf. *at least*—‘weakening’)

処理努力 (processing efforts) とは聞き手が発話を理解するときのコンテキストの大きさ・想定への接近のしやすさ (accessibility) ・言語的、心理的複雑さ (例：center-embedded construction) ・語の使用頻度などにより影響を受ける。

関連性と語用論

関連性理論では語用論 (pragmatics) は社会的 (social) なものでなく、utterance を理解するときに関わる頭の中にある一般的な認知的 (cognitive) 原理、能力および効果の研究である。中央系 (central system) に属し、モジュール性 (modular) があり、言葉によるコミュニケーション (verbal communication) のすべてを説明することを目指す。

一定の入力 input に対して常に一定の決まった output をもたらす code system ではなく、コンテキストの情報により影響を受け、一定の入力に対して聞き手の知識 (assumptions) により、異なった output がなぜ出るということを正しく説明できる理論 (explanatory pragmatic theory) である。

関連性と認知

- A. The human mind is set up in such a way that it automatically pays attention to information that seems to be relevant.
- B. Relevance is the key to communication. —Blass (1990 : 43)
- C. Our cognition is based not on quantitative but on comparative concepts.
(→optimal relevance/resemblance/interpretive use)

関連性理論の枠組み

自然言語の文は Linguistic semantics (言語的意味論) により個々の code system で記号化

された concept を Logical forms (論理形式) に translation (翻訳) する。この logical forms は現実の世界と照らし合わせて true か false か分かるまで pragmatics の中で十分に豊かにされる (enrichment)。指示対象の指定 (reference assignment) などが行われる。こうしてできた完全な命題形式 (propositional forms) は thoughts (聞き手が個人的に頭の中で捉えた, 話し手が伝えたいと思っていた考え) であり, この thoughts に対して states of affairs (状況—現実の世界) と照合して truth conditions あるいは resemblance の度合が与えられる。すなわち, 関連性理論では頭の中にあるものと外界とを結びつけているのである。

Cf. Montague semantics—頭の中と外界を結びつけていないので不十分


natural language sentence—→truth conditional semantics—→truth conditions

Johnson-Laird's Mental model approach—外界もすべて頭の中にあるとするので不十分

Situation Semantics—意味は頭の中にではなく世界の状況にある

natural language sentence—→situation semantics—→situations

図1 関連性理論の枠組み: Wilson & Sperber (1993: 5)



-
- ① Utterance : (iB) I can't.
Lower-level explicature : (B'') Mary can't help Peter to find a job.
- ② Higher-level explicatures : (iii) [Mary says/believes/regrets that] she can't help Peter to find a job.
- ③ (iv) Please you are standing on my foot.
<→you should get off your foot.>
- ④ Wilson & Sperber (1993: 21)
"Pronouns impose constraints on (lower-level) explicatures : they guide the search for the intended referent, which is part of the proposition expressed."
(v) I don't like it.
- ⑤ Wilson & Sperber (1993: 22)
the dissociative particle 'huh' : encodes a constraint on higher-level explicatures
(vi) a. Peter's a genius, huh!
b. [Mary (=The speaker) doesn't think that] Peter's a genius.
- ⑥ Wilson & Sperber (1993: 21)
"Discourse connectives impose constraints on implicatures : they guide the search for intended contexts and contextual effects." 例 : SO, AFTER ALL
(vii) It's raining. So the grass is wet.
Soによる手続き的情報 : the grass is wetを<結論>として処理しなさい

図2 発話により伝わる情報 Wilson & Sperber (1993 : 3)




図3

記述的用法(Descriptive use)

Use of utterances to describe the world (truly or falsely)

解釈的用法(Interpretive use)

Use of utterances to interpret other utterances or thoughts which resemble in content.

(a) loose use e. g. metaphor, (metonymy)

(b) echoic use e. g. echo questions, irony

(c) metalinguistic use

(metarepresentation = def. the representation of another representation)

e. g. metalinguistic negation

Cf. Hedges and concepts (Itani 1995)

"*sort of* indicates that the word that it modifies is to be interpreted loosely." (p.89)

"*sort of* loosens the concept encoded by the following word, directing the hearer to widen its application in some way" (p. 104)

(i) Tom is *sort of* a bachelor.

<Tom does not have certain stereotypical properties of bachelors, such as, perhaps, taking a free and easy attitude to relationships with women, enjoying going out drinking with male friends, etc.>

(ii) A bat is *sort of* a bird. —< ad hoc concept construction>

"*sort of* x directs the building of a new concept X' which does not include the defining properties of X, while the new concept built from a *typical* x does." (p.93)

(iii) Tom is a *typical* bachelor.

"What modification by a *typical* does is narrow down the set of people picked out, from all bachelors to just those bachelors who have stereotypical properties." (p. 94)

"a *typical*, on the other hand, narrows the concept encoded by the following word, focusing on its stereotypical encyclopaedic properties while maintaining its logical content" (p. 104)

(iv) A bat is *technically* a mammal.

"the expression *technically a mammal* is used to communicate the concept MAMMAL with the focus on the essential (biological) properties of a mammal rather than other properties associated with mammals such as living on land, walking, etc all of which are stereotypic encyclopaedic properties of the concept MAMMAL." (p. 100)

"the sentence adverbial *technically* indicates that the expression it modifies involves representation by resemblance." (p. 104)

19. Conclusions :

- (i) 関連性理論では従来の truth-based approach や coherence や cohesion に基づく談話分析では説明できなかった多くの談話に関する言語事実の説明が可能であること。
- (ii) 関連性理論 (Relevance Theory) が従来の語用論と異なり、命題の内部の意味の決定 (THE など) にも強く関わること。
- (iii) 関連性理論は概念の narrowing/widening に関する原理的説明が可能で、metonymy の現象など説明可能であること。
- (iv) 関連性理論では談話不変化詞 (ALSO, TOO) など进行分析することにより、人間の脳 (中央系) の中での認知的処理方法・方向性など知の構造・メカニズムに関する仮説をたてることができる。
- (v) 関連性理論では談話不変化詞の typology などこれまでにない全く新たな分析方法で自然言語の認知に基づく体系化が可能で、今後の認知語用論の中心となると思われる。
- (vi) 関連性理論で現在盛んに議論されている echo questions の問題なども類似性 (resemblance) という考えを用いることにより従来の意味論では分析しにくかった疑問文・命令文などの分析もかなり進んでいる。

NOTES

注1 本稿は1995. 12. 9. 日本認知科学会冬のシンポジウムで発表した内容に加筆・修正を加えたものである。

注2 桑畑・本多(1997)では日本語名詞の多義性を調べた結果、たまご→鶏のたまごのように狭くなる方が、広くなるより圧倒的に多かったと報告しているが、これは関連性理論では concept narrowing の方が concept widening よりも頭の中での処理努力が少なくすすむからと説明可能である。

Cf. Saliency model/context-sensitive model

Langacker (i) a. He sat on the tomato.

b. He peeled the tomato.

注3 Ted J. M. Sanders, Wilbert P. M. Spooren and Leo G. M. Noordman (1993: 103) による coherence の関係の例:

Cause-Consequence/Condition-Consequence/Contrastive Cause-Consequence/
Consequence-Cause/Consequence-Condition/Contrastive Consequence-Cause/
Argument-Claim/Condition-Claim/Contrastive Argument-Claim/
Claim-Argument/Claim-Condition/Contrastive Claim-Argument/
List/Opposition/Exception/Enumeration/Concession

注4 中村(1997)では大統領の演説 we の解釈として以下の例を示している:

(i) 大統領自身「I」の意: We wish our friends the world over to know this above all.

(ii) 聴衆「You」の意: We are free men.

(iii) 大統領+政府閣僚: We must be ready to dare all for our country.

(iv) 大統領自身+聴者: We bring all our wit and all our will to meet the question.

注5 同じ固有名詞の繰り返しだが、「オズワルド」→「ケネディー大統領の暗殺者」→「暗殺者・犯人」の意で談話の中ではメトニミー的に意味を変えることがあるので注意 [橋本1998]:

[i] Four persons are listening to Cox's report about the case.

- a. Cox : ...In January 1961, in New Orleans, at the Bolton Ford dealership, when *the Oswald we know* is in Russia, there's...
- b. Cox : Banister has *someone usin' the name Oswald* to buy the trucks...
- c. Cox : ...The CIA has a camera outside the Cuban Embassy, and they say that this is *Oswald in Mexico*...

OSER : If it is *Oswald*, it must be *our third Oswald*. — *JFK*

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